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Abstract
Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks.
One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize
potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, a
contract-based principal-agent framework is proposed in the context of a cognitive-radio-based wireless relaying
networks in which the sources’ wireless characteristics constitute hidden information which is not known by the relay.
The problem is modeled as a monopolist’s problem, in which a mobile relay node acts as the principal who designs
incentive-compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs.
Subsequently, contract items can be broadcast by the relay to nearby mobile users that want to send data. Once
these sources optimally select an item and notify the relay that they are willing to accept it, the relay then chooses
one source based on the highest revenue for which to provide service. The cooperative gain, relay’s revenue, and
expected data rate are characterized for the optimal contract under complete information and incomplete
information. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that this pricing mechanism can lead to a win-win
situation in which source nodes get good communication service and relay nodes maximize their own profit that can,
in turn, be used to purchase the relay service of other nodes when needed in the future. Moreover, the proposed
mechanism is shown to also exhibit other important features such as low complexity and low signaling overhead.
Keywords: Cooperative communication; Incentive mechanism; Cognitive radio; Relaying networks; Contract theory
1 Introduction
Multiuser cooperative communication has emerged as
a promising technique for boosting the performance
of wireless networks [1,2]. The basic premise of coop-
erative communications is to allow a mobile user to
act as a relay node to help other neighboring mobile
users via short-range communication technologies such
as Wi-Fi, cellular device-to-device communications, or
Bluetooth, among others. Relay has many advantages
such as improving the system throughput and coverage,
enhancing the link rate and reliability as well as reducing
network energy consumption [3]. In addition, there is no
need to upgrade existing infrastructure in order to install
additional relay nodes [4]. Recent results have been shown
that the capacity improves 200% and 300% for downlink
and uplink respectively due to multiuser cooperation for
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cell edge users [4]. However, deploying practical coopera-
tive communication protocols requires overcoming many
technical challenges that include reducing the complex-
ity for cooperation, managing interference, and designing
suitable incentive mechanisms to facilitate relaying and
cooperation [5-10].
In recent years, with the advent of highly advanced
smartphones, which are capable of simultaneously sup-
porting multi-mode radio access, including cellular
network, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth, the possibility of cooper-
ative communication at the smartphone level has become
more manageable. However, there still remains a need
to design low-complexity, distributed cooperative com-
munication mechanisms, which is both challenging and
desirable. First, a serious problem of signaling overhead
may increase the cost of operation in a distributed relay
network. Second, mobile nodes are constrained by limited
power and computational resources such as CPUs or bat-
teries. Furthermore, while the use of relaying can improve
the data rate of the source user, it can be detrimental to
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the relay node that must utilize its own power to trans-
mit another node’s data. Indeed, some mobile nodes have
no incentive to relay the packets of other nodes due to the
limitation of battery. Therefore, for such scenarios, dis-
tributed incentivemechanisms are necessary to encourage
mobile relay nodes to help one another via monetary pay-
ments or credits. Here, a mobile relay node can use its
earned monetary to purchase the help of other nodes
when needed in the future. Thus, it is of interest to develop
incentive mechanisms using which all the nodes, sources
and relays, can obtain a certain benefit.
The introduction of incentive mechanisms in cooper-
ative networks has attracted attention in the literature
[5-14]. One popular approach is the use of game-
theoretic techniques to introduce distributed pricing
mechanisms in cooperative networks [5-8,11]. However,
such approaches are often based on game-theoretic
notions such as Nash bargaining that require many rounds
of negotiation between the nodes which can result in
a higher signaling overhead and increased complexity.
Auction-theoretic algorithms (a subset of game theory)
also require at least two bidder to compete a auction target
[5,6]. Another promising approach that has recently been
studied is that of contract theory [15]. Contract theory
has been used to study economic contracts between ser-
vice providers as well as issues related to spectrum sharing
[13,14] and relaying [9,10]. However, in the existing lit-
erature such as [9] and [10], they assume that the relay
volunteer their services. The source dominates the trad-
ing process and puts a price on relay service, resulting
in that the source gets the main gain of cooperation. So,
the approach in [9] and [10] cannot really encourage relay
node to provide help.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a
novel contract-based approach to incentivize cooperative
communication in wireless networks. The key contribu-
tions include:
1. We address the problem of cooperative
communication using a novel contract-based
principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-
based wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile
relay node acts as the principal who designs
incentive-compatible (IC) and individually rational
(IR) contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price
pairs.
2. We analyze the monopolistic nonlinear pricing
problem under complete information and
incomplete information. We first consider the
complete information scenario as a benchmark and
analyze the feasibility and optimality of contract
under incomplete information. Then, we further
characterize the solution of optimal contract in two
scenarios.
3. We characterize cooperative gain (i.e., social
surplus), relay’s revenue, and expected data rate in
the optimal contract under complete information
and incomplete information. Theoretical analysis and
numerical results indicate that this pricing
mechanism can lead to a win-win situation in which
source nodes get good communication service and
the relay is encouraged since it makes most of
cooperation gain from the source.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we will first present our system model and
contract formulation. In Section 3, we propose the opti-
mal contract under complete information. In Section 4,
we design a contract with feasibility and optimality under
incomplete information. Section 5 presents the simula-
tion results and analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section 6.
2 Systemmodel
We consider a cognitive radio (CR) network that is using
the underlay spectrum sharing model shown in Figure 1,
which has been studied [16] without considering the
two-hop relaying communication. This model consists of
CR-enabled mobile stations accessing the communication
network via conventional cellular base stations (BSs). In
this network, somemobile stations (personal devices), act-
ing as source nodes, seek to send data to a far BS with
the help of neighboring mobile relays that have a good
wireless link with its BS. The data will then be forwarded
by relay to the ultimate destination of the source. How-
ever, the relays have their own data to send and may not
be willing to assist the source. Therefore, it is of inter-
est to introduce incentive mechanisms that can encourage
mobile devices to relay each others data. To address this
problem, we propose a novel approach based on contract






































Figure 1 CR-based hybrid network architecture.
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the relay is given absolute pricing power to maximize its
profit on the premise that contract will be accepted by the
sources.
In our underlay sharing model, sources are allowed to
adaptively select available spectrum while guaranteeing a
certain quality-of-service (QoS) for the primary user (PU)
as well as improving spectrum utilization effectively. The
channel between the source node Si(i = 1, 2, . . . ,N) and
the PU (or the relay R) is assumed to be independent
slowly varying flat Rayleigh fading with variance 1/λSiP
(1/λSiR). Hence, the channel gain coefficients |hSiP|2 and
|hSiR|2 are exponentially distributed random variable with
probability density function (PDF) f (x) = λe−λx,∀x ≥ 0,
where λ is λSiP or λSiR, respectively [17]. The sources can
share the PU’s spectrum if the power of the received sig-
nal at the receiver of the PU is within a predetermined
threshold Ith as follows: PSi |hSiP|2 ≤ Ith, where PSi is the
transmit power of the source Si. Hence, the maximum
transmit power of the sources is limited to Ith/|hSiP|2. So,
the sources have different transmission rates:







whereW is the channel bandwidth, and σ 2 is the variance
of the white Guassian noise at the receiver. Without loss
of generality, we assume W = 1 and σ 2 is identical for all
sources.
2.1 Relay nodemodel
According to the various values of the sources’ capacity,
we classify the sources into different type-θ classes. We
denote the set of all source types as  = [θ , θ] ⊆ . The
source can obtain its own type by measuring and sens-
ing the wireless environment, while the relay is unaware
of the exact type of a particular source before it formu-
lates contract items, consisting of a set of rate-price pairs.
This ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ is private for the source
or in other words ‘hidden information’. Nevertheless, we
assume the relay has a prior distribution over  given
by P(θ) with a continuous density p(θ) > 0. Although
the source informs the relay of this private information,
the relay has to also consider the cost of receiving and
forwarding data, which includes: cost of energy used to
receive and forward data, cost of time when receiving and
forwarding data, current battery level, as well as other
factors.
Here, we note that the transmission rate of the CR-based
link between source and relay is limited due to its transmit
power constraint. If the transmission rate is too low, the
relay is unwilling to serve the source for a long time since
the gains from cooperation may be small. In contrast, if
it is too high, the relay is unwilling to serve the source
for a long time because this will reduce its profit (the
cost of forwarding data via the relay will increase sharply,
e.g., its transmit power must be increased exponentially
to increase its data rate by two times under the constant
condition of wireless environment). Thus, we define a
transmission time ratio, denoted by q ∈ Q = [0, 1], as the
ratio between the transmission time given by the relay and
a cooperative slot. The source and the relay negotiate a
contract on a pair (q,π), with time ratio q and a tariff (ser-
vice price) π ∈ . The contract is a pair of function (q,π) :
 → Q ×  that can be viewed as a rule relating the
choice of q and π about sources’ type θ . Here, we consider
two main cost factors: C(q), the cost of time for receiving
data, and G(qθ), the cost of forwarding data with an aver-
age transmission rate qθ bps in a slot. It is easy to see that
C(·) andG (·) are non-negative, monotone increasing, and
twice differentiable. We further assume that the marginal
costs C′(·) and G′ (·) are non-decreasing, that is, C(·) and
G (·) grow more rapidly at high quantities than they do at
small quantities.
Therefore, the revenue R(θ , q) of a relay that is for-
warding data with a rate qθ bps in a slot is given by
the difference between the service price and the cost of
transmission:
R(θ , q) = π(θ) − C(q) − G(qθ) . (2)
The objective of relay is thus to maximize its revenue in
Equation 2.
2.2 Source nodemodel
In our model, the source seeks to optimize its data rate.
This rate is related not only to the capacity of the source
θ , in a slot, but also to the transmission time ratio q
allocated by a relay. Thus, we define the valuation of a
type-θ source for the average transmission rate qθ bps,
denoted by V (θ , q), as the utility of a source when using
a relay’s help. We assume V (θ , q) can simply be given by
f (qθ), where f (·) should be monotonically increasing and
concave function. Naturally, the higher the rate that is
available to source, the more beneficial it is for the source.
However, f ′(·), the marginal utility (MU) of the average
transmission rate reflects the additional satisfaction that
a source gains from consuming one more unit of average
data rate. MU is decreasing with the increase of aver-
age transmission rate according to the law of diminishing
marginal utility. Here, we can assume that f (·) is given by
an α-fair utility function [18]:
f (qθ) =
{
ω(1 − α)−1(qθ)1−α , 0 ≤ α < 1 ;
ωlog(qθ), α = 1 . (3)
where ω is the utility level of the source, which represents
the source’s need for the different applications [12].
It is easy to see that Vq(θ , q) = θ f ′ > 0 and Vθ (θ , q) =
qf ′ > 0 for all q, that is, every source prefers higher val-
uation for a given transmission time ratio, a higher type
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source has greater valuation than a lower one. We can fur-
ther see that Vqq(θ , q) = θ2f ′′ < 0 , that is, V (θ , q) grows
more slowly with a larger transmission time ratio. Thus,
for a contract pair (q(θ),π(θ)), we can now define a utility
function for the source as the difference between the val-
uation and the service price (i.e., money transfer) for the
cooperative transmission:
U(θ , q) = V (θ , q) − π(θ) . (4)
We assume that each source is selfish and rational, that
is seeking to always choose q from a contract to maximize
his utility. Thus, the optimal strategy for a type-θ source
can be written as:
q˜(θ) = argmax
q∈Q
V (θ , q) − π(θ) . (5)
Note that q(θ) = 0 means that the optimal strategy for
the source is not to buy any resources from the relays.
2.3 Formulation of contracts under incomplete
information
Contract theory studies how economic decision-maker
construct contractual arrangements, generally in the pres-
ence of hidden information [15]. In our model, the
sources’ types constitute hidden information that is
known only to the sources themselves. The relay does
not know the type of each source, θ , and, thus, it needs
to design contract items to attract the source to take
part in cooperative communications. We assume that the
relay has a prior distribution P(θ) over . According to
the revelation principle [15], for any feasible contract of
incomplete information, there exists a payoff-equivalent
revelation mechanism that enables the sources to truth-
fully report their types. Because of this, it is enough to
design a optimal contract that consists of contract items
(q(θ),π(θ)) for each source.
In this respect, we consider the optimal contract design
for two information scenarios.
• Complete information. This is a benchmark case,
where the relay knows each source’s type. we will
compute the maximum cooperative gain, which
serves as an upper bound of the cooperative gain in
the incomplete scenarios.
• Incomplete information. The relay does not know
each source’s type but has the knowledge of
distribution of each type. The relay needs to design a
contract to maximize its expected revenue.
Once the relay has determined the contract base on its
own surplus data rate and cost of forwarding data, the
interactions between the relay and sources will follow four
steps.
1) The relay broadcast the contract items (q(θ),π(θ))
to N weak sources belonging to a group, all of whom
seek to benefit from cooperative with it.
2) After receiving the contract items, each weak source
chooses one contract item to maximize its utility and
inform the relay its choice.
3) After receiving all sources confirmations, the relay
informs one selected source whose choice can make
the relay to maximize its revenue.
4) The cooperative communications between the relay
and the selected source begin.
3 Optimal contract design under complete
information: the benchmark scenario
In the complete information scenario, the relay knows
precisely the type of each source. We will use the maxi-
mum relay’s revenue in this case to evaluate the contract
performance under incomplete information.
As the relay knows source’s type, it can make sure that
source accepts the contract item designed for its type.
In addition, due to the selfish and rational nature of the
source, a source will never choose a contract that can
reduce its utility beyond its reservation utility V (θ , 0).
Without loss of generality, we normalize V (θ , 0) to zero.
Thus, the relay needs to ensure that the source has non-
negative utility so that they are willing to accept the con-
tract. This property allows to enforce IR on the sources.
Formally, we can write the IR constraint as:
V (θ , q(θ)) − π(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈  . (6)
We say a contract is optimal if it yields the maximum
revenue for the relay under current information scenario.
In the complete information scenario, an optimal contract
can be stated as choosing a pair (q(θ),π(θ)) to maximize
the relay’s revenue for a source type of θ as follows
max
q(·),π(·)
π(θ) − C(q(θ)) − G(q(θ)θ) , (7)
subject to the IR constraints in Equation 6.
Since relay’s revenue in Equation 7 is increasing in π(θ),
the relay can increase its revenue by increasing π(θ) until
V (θ , q(θ))−π(θ) = 0 and gives source zero utility. There-
fore, setting Equation 6 to equality, substituting it into
Equation 7 and simplifying the relay’s revenue maximiza-
tion problem in Equation 7 as
max
q(·)
V (θ , q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) − G(q(θ)θ) . (8)
The social surplus, denoted by S(θ , q), generated by a
relay’s selling of service with transmission time ratio q to
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a type-θ source is defined as the aggregate utilities of both
source and relay:
S(θ , q) 	= R(θ , q)+U(θ , q) = V (θ , q)−C(q)−G(qθ) ,
(9)
which reflects the gain from the cooperation between
source and relay. Before turning to the analysis of the solu-
tion, we define the first best solution denoted by qfb(θ) as
the solution of Equation 8, which would be the optimal
decision (i.e., the social optimal transmission time ratio
for type-θ ) if the relay found the source’s type. It is easy
to see that Sqq(θ , q) = Vqq(θ , q) − C′′(q) − θ2G′′(qθ) <
0, and qfb(θ) can be obtain by solving Sq(q, θ) =
θ
[
f ′(qθ) − G′(qθ)] − C′(q) = 0 using the implicit func-
tion theorem. Thus, the maximum social surplus for each
type-θ can be written as Sfb(θ) = S(θ , qfb(θ)). Here, unlike
traditional contract models [15] and [13] in which qfb(θ)
and Sfb(θ) are both monotone increasing with respect to
θ , the change trend of qfb(θ) is such that it firstly increases
and then decreases with the increasing of θ as shown
in Figure 2. Since qfbθ (θ) = f
′(qθ)−G′(qθ)+qθ[f ′′(qθ)−G′′(qθ)]
C′(q)−θ2(f ′′(qθ)−G′′(qθ)) ,
there exists a stationary point qθ = c0.
In practice, the social optimal decision may not be
adopted by both the source and the relay, whose objectives
are always to maximize their own utilities, without con-
sidering the social surplus. Therefore, there is a need to
capture this selfish nature of the source and relay.
4 Optimal contract design under incomplete
information
In this section, we will address the monopolist’s problem
and analyze the feasibility and optimality of the solu-
tion. Furthermore, the best price assignment and the best
transmission time ratio assignment will be derived.
We formulate the problem as a monopolist contract
design in which the principal (relay) proposes a con-
tract pair (q(θ),π(θ)) to an agent (source) and, then, the
source chooses a unique transmission time ratio q˜(θ) and
performs a money transfer π˜(θ) to the relay. In gen-
eral, π(q(θ)) is simply written as π(θ) since q(θ) is a
single-value function. A implementable contract is a set
of (q(θ),π(θ)) such that for every type θ ∈ , a type-θ
source prefers the relaying service with transmission time
ratio q(θ) at the price π(θ) while it does not choose any
relaying service with other transmission time ratio at all.
Formally, a decision function q(θ) is implementable by a
money transfer π(θ) if the IC constraints are satisfied:
V (θ , q(θ)) − π(θ) ≥ V (θ , q(θ˜)) − π(θ˜), ∀θ , θ˜ ∈  .
(10)
Equivalently, the contract (q(θ),π(θ)) is implementable.
An implementable contract that satisfies the IR con-
straint in Equation 6 is called feasible. In other words, a
feasible contract must satisfy the IC and IR constraints.
Using the revelation principle, themonopolist’s problem
under incomplete information can be stated as choosing a






π(θ) − C(q(θ)) − G(q(θ)θ)]p(θ)dθ , (11)
subject to the IC and IR constraints in Equations 10 and 6.
The term G(qθ) in the cost of transmission leads to a
non-standard form of the monopolist’s problem. There-
fore, it must be transformed into a standard form by the
method of variable substitution. Making the substitution
















Figure 2 The first best solution qfb and the regions CS+ and CS−.
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Vˆ (θ , q) = V (θ , q) −G(qθ), πˆ(θ) = π(θ) −G(qθ) reduces






πˆ(θ) − C(q(θ))]p(θ)dθ , (12)
s.t.
(IC’)
Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − πˆ(θ) ≥ Vˆ (θ , q(θ˜ )) − πˆ(θ˜ ), ∀θ , θ˜ ∈  ,
(IR’)
Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − πˆ(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈  .
4.1 Feasibility of contract
Furthermore, as shown in [19,20], an agent’s (source’s)
utility function Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) in the standard monopolist’s
problem does not satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees conditions
(SMCs) or single-crossing property (SCP), which implies
that Vˆqθ does not change sign for any value of q and θ .
So, the local incentive compatibility constraints have to
taken into account. These constraints are equivalent to
the monotonicity of the decision variable with respect
to the parameter θ . In addition, following [20], we also
relax the SMC so as to provide a simple characterization
of implementability.
Definition 1. The relaxing single-crossing or Spence-
Mirrlees condition is the constant sign of the cross partial
derivative with respect to decision and type:
(CS+) ∀(q, θ) in Q ×  : Vˆqθ > 0,
(CS–) ∀(q, θ) in Q ×  : Vˆqθ < 0.
This implies that the existence of a curve q0(θ) divid-
ing the (θ , q) plane into two single-crossing regions, with
Vqθ > 0 below q0 and Vqθ < 0 above. For notational
convenience, we use CS+ and CS− respectively to repre-
sent these regions, as we can see in Figure 2. Under CS+
(CS−), higher types are associated with higher (lower)
marginal valuational of the decision.
Using the implicit function theorem, we can define a
unique function q0(θ), such that Vˆqθ = 0, i.e., Vˆqθ =
f ′(qθ) − G′(qθ) + qθ [f ′′(qθ) − G′′(qθ)] 	= ψ(qθ) = 0,
so q0(θ) = ψ−1(0)/θ , it is easy see that q0(θ) is a unique
decreasing function.
Remark 1. The equation Vˆqθ = 0 allows to implicitly
define a function q0(θ) such that Vˆqθ > 0 when q < q0(θ)
(CS+) and Vˆqθ < 0 when q > q0(θ)(CS-).
When Vˆqθ satisfies the relaxing single-crossing condi-
tion, one can show that implementability is equivalent
to the monotonicity of the quantity assignment function,
with increasing under (CS+) or decreasing under (CS−).
Lemma 1. Let (q(θ), πˆ(θ)) be an IC mechanism, then the
following condition must be fulfilled:
1. Vq(θ) := Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − πˆ(θ) =
Vq(θ) + ∫ θ
θ
Vˆθ (θ˜ , q(θ˜))dθ˜ , ∀θ ∈  ,
2. q(θ) is non-decreasing (non-increasing) under CS+
(CS-), i.e., qθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0.
Proof. The first part follows the envelope theorem,
whose proofs can be found in [20]. By the first part in
lemma, for each implementable q(θ), there exits a unique
πˆ(θ) that implements it:
πˆ(θ) = Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − Vq(θ), ∀θ ∈ . (13)
The global IC’ in Equation 12 requires that Vq(θ) −
Vˆ (θ , q(θ˜)) + πˆ(θ˜ ) ≥ 0. Using Equation 13, we get
q(θ , θ˜ ) 	= Vq(θ)− Vˆ (θ , q(θ˜ ))+ πˆ(θ˜ ) = Vq(θ)−Vq(θ˜)+
Vˆ (θ˜ , q(θ˜)) − Vˆ (θ , q(θ˜)) = ∫ θ
θ˜
[∫ q(θˆ)
q(θ˜) Vˆqθ (θˆ , qˆ)dqˆ
]
dθˆ ≥ 0
(where the third equality is a consequence of the funda-
mental theorem of calculus), i.e., qθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0.
For the IR’ constraint, if Vˆθ = q(f ′(qθ) − G′(qθ))
changes its sign, Vq in the Lemma 1 has a minimum in the
interior of  (or at θ ) depending on q [20]. However, in
order to simplify matters, we assume that it is at θ . Thus,
the IR’constraint needs to be checked only at θ and, since
transfer is costly to the principal (relay), IR’ must bind at
θ , i.e., the IR’ constraint can be replaced by Vq(θ) = 0.
Therefore, the condition in Lemma 1 and Vq(θ) = 0
provides stricter and tighter necessary conditions for the
feasible contract.
4.2 Optimality of contract
Among the possible feasible contracts, our objective is to
find an optimal contract.We first derive the best prices for
a fixed feasible transmission time ratio assignment; then,
we derive the best transmission time ratio assignment for
the optimal contract.
Given an implementable mechanism (q(θ), πˆ(θ)), there
is a non-linear transfer πˆ(θ) that implements q(θ). And
Theorem 1. Let (q(θ), πˆ(θ)) be a feasible contract with
the fixed decision variable assignment q(θ). Then, the
unique best price assignment is given by:
πˆ(θ) = Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) −
∫ θ
θ
Vˆθ (θ˜ , q(θ˜)dθ˜ . (14)
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Proof. By Lemma 1, for each implementable q(θ), there
exits a unique
πˆ(θ) = Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − Vq(θ) −
∫ θ
θ
Vˆθ (θ˜ , q(θ˜))dθ˜ . (15)
Furthermore, according to IR’ condition, we have
Vq(θ) = 0. Plugging it into the above equation completes
the proof.
Thus, as the unique best price assignment for the fea-
sible contract (q(θ), πˆ(θ)) has been given, we can make a
transformation back into terms of π(θ) bymaking the sub-
stitution Vˆ (θ , q) = V (θ , q)−G(qθ), πˆ(θ) = π(θ)−G(qθ).
As a result, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The unique best price assignment for the
feasible contract (q(θ),π(θ)) is given by:








Theorem 1 suggests that, for any fixed feasible decision
variable assignment q(θ), the best price assignment given
by Equation 14 is unique. Therefore, for the monopolist’s
problem, we plug Equation 14 into the objective function








Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) −
∫ θ
θ




Integrating by parts, we have
∫

h(θ , q(θ))p(θ)dθ , where
h(θ , q(θ)) = Vˆ (θ , q(θ)) − C(q(θ)) − 1−P(θ)p(θ) Vˆθ (θ , q(θ))
is the virtual surplus. Thus, we consider the IC’ and
IR’ constraints and denote qsb(θ) as the solution which





h(θ , q(θ))p(θ)dθ , (18)
which can be reduced to a pointwise maximization of the
h(θ , q(θ)). Obviously, qsb(θ) can be found at the bound-
ary points (θ and θ¯ ) or at the critical point, i.e., according
to Fermat’s theorem for stationary points, qsb(θ) satisfying
hq(θ , qsb(θ)) = 0 and hqq(θ , qsb(θ)) ≤ 0, for all θ ∈ . It is
easy to see that the virtual surplus h(θ , q(θ)) is the social
surplus (Vˆ − C) discounted by the agent’s information
rent − 1−Pp Vˆθ .
Proposition 1. The optimal decision qfb satisfies the sec-
ond term condition in the Lemma 1, i.e., qfbθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0.
Proof. From the previous calculations, we know that
Vˆqθ = f ′(qθ) − G′(qθ) + qθ
[
f ′′(qθ) − G′′(qθ)], and
qfbθ (θ) = VˆqθC′(q)−θ2(f ′′(qθ)−G′′(qθ)) , whose denominator is
non-negative. So, qfbθ Vˆqθ ≥ 0.
This proposition suggest that the solution qfb of the
maximum social surplus is implementable. However, the
qsb may be unimplementable since the agent’s information
rent − 1−Pp Vˆθ in the virtual surplus depends on the distri-
bution of source types. If the qsb(θ) is implementable, then
it is the solution of the problem (Equation 12) subject to
IC’ and IR’ constrains. Therefore, under the SMC, qsb(θ)
is the solution of the problem (Equation 12) if and only
if it is monotonic. Otherwise, the monotonicity condition
qθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0 in Lemma 1 is binding. When qθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0
is binding, one has to respectively perform the ironing
principle [20] on qsb(θ) under the region CS+ and CS− to
make the infeasible region to be feasible (for a complete
analysis of the standard case, see [15]). Using this prin-
ciple, we design a dynamic algorithm too. The detailed
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, where an infeasible
region [θ1, θ2] is defined as a subset of , such that ∀θ ∈
[θ1, θ2], the monotonicity condition qθ (θ)Vˆqθ ≥ 0 is vio-
lating. By ironing algorithm, we get a feasible solution of
the problem (Equation 12).
Algorithm 1 Ironing algorithm
1: Initiate qsb(θ) = argmaxqh(θ , q) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀θ ∈ ;
2: In region CS+ (CS−), while qsb(θ) is not feasible, do:
• find a ironing interval [θ1, θ2] ⊂ , so that:{
qsb(θ1) = qsb(θ2)∫ θ2
θ1
hq(θ , q(θ))p(θ)dθ = 0
• set qsb(θ) = qsb(θ1), ∀θ ∈ [θ1, θ2];
4.3 Multiple-source selection and revenue
In the last section, we applied the contract-based
principal-agent framework to a cognitive-radio-based
wireless relaying networks, in which a mobile relay acts
as the principal who designs IC and IR contract items
(q(θ),π(θ)), which are then broadcast to N weak sources.
After receiving all sources confirmations, the relay needs
to choose one source who can make the relay to maxi-
mize its revenue. Obviously, the higher the source type,
the more revenue got by relay. From Lemma 1, it can be
seen that the transmission time ratio assignments qsb in
the optimal contracts are non-increasing under the region
CS−. This means that the higher source type-θ (exceeding
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a threshold θ1 or θ2, when θ blows the threshold, qsb = 0
as shown in Figure 3, denotes that relay receives zero rev-
enue) will obtain the less transmission time ratio assign-
ments. Moreover, the same cost of forwarding data, the
relay prefers to service for high source type with more less
transmission time assignments. Thus, the relay will natu-
rally choose a high type source who owns the maximum
transmission rate among all weak sources.
We now calculate the revenue generated by the relay,
keeping in mind that the relay’s revenue can change with
the number of sources N and probability distribution of
θi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N). The revenue obtained from optimal
contract is the key parameter that stimulates coopera-
tive in the relaying network. In our cognitive-radio-based
underlay sharing model, all channels are assumed to be
independent and identically slowly varying flat Rayleigh
fading channel. According to [21] and the transformation





2x − 1 + λiPIth
λiRσ 2
)2 , (19)




2x − 1 + λiPIth
λiRσ 2
. (20)
Let us introduce some notations. Given the number of
sources N and the PDF of type-θi, the revenue accrued by
the relay from the optimal contract (q(θ),π(θ)) is denoted
by E(R), the social surplus accrued by the source and relay
is denoted by E(S), and expected average transmission
rate obtained by all sources is denoted by E(qθ).
Theorem 2. The expected revenue E(R), excepted social
surplus E(S), and expected average rate E(qθ) from the
optimal contract (q(θ),π(θ)) with N sources under both

















Proof. Define 1 as the event that the source S1 pur-
chases the relay service from the competition of N
sources. The probability that source S1 possesses the high-
est transmission rate is given by










The expected revenue for the seller from source S1 alone
is derived next. The conditional payment made by the
highest type source S1 can be written as



















































qsb, Incomplete info., Case A





Figure 3 The transmission time ratio and price assignments in the optimal contracts.
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Therefore, using Equations 24 and 25, the expected















= 1/N , substituting in to
Equation 26 and omitting the subscript of θi, we obtain the
result of Equation 21.
Similarity, we can obtain the results of Equations 22
and 23.
5 Simulation results
Here we use numerical results to show the performance
of the proposed contracts in different environments. In a
common environment, two different distributions of type
θ for purposes of research will be investigated on the
contract effect of different distributions. In the Rayleigh
fading channel environment, we will capture the coop-
erative gain and performance improvement with respect
to the predetermined threshold Ith and the number of
sources.
5.1 A common environment
In this environment, we implement the proposed contract
in a continuous-type model. A source type θ is distributed
with a probability distribution p(θ) on the interval [0, 3].
In our simulations, parameters α and ω of utility func-
tion are set to 0.5 and 1, respectively. The cost functions
of the relay are defined as C(q) = 0.5q1.2 and G(qθ) =
0.5(qθ)2. We investigate the optimal contracts in two sce-
narios which differ from one another in the distribution of
type. In case A, all types are uniformly distributed on the
[0, 3] with p(θ) = 1/3; in case B, the large type has larger
probability than the small type, where p(θ) = 2θ/9.
Figures 3 and 4 present the transmission time ratio
and the best price assignments in the optimal contracts,
respectively. In Figure 3, the curve with circle represents
the social optimal transmission time ratio assignments
under complete information, i.e., the first best solution
qfb, which maximizes the social surplus. The curves with
square and cross denote the optimal transmission time
ratio assignments qsb in the optimal contracts under
incomplete information for scenarios A and B, respec-
tively. It can be seen that qsb is non-decreasing (non-
increasing) under the region CS+ (CS−), satisfies the
second term condition in Lemma 1. Note, for example,
in case A, where q(θ) = 1 denotes that the transmis-
sion time ratio assignments reach the maximum, where
q(θ) = 0, i.e., θ ∈ [0, θ1], denotes an aborted trad-
ing process; when θ ∈ (θ1, 3], the transmission time
ratio assignment in the optimal contract under incom-
plete information is always more than the social optimal
ratio assignment under complete information. This can
be explained as follows, for the propose of revenue maxi-
mizing, the relay will reduce the supply to the lower type
source and increase the time assignment to the higher
type source. Meanwhile, it charges a much higher price
from the source. Furthermore, if the probability of lower
type sources becomes smaller, e.g., case B, the relay tends
to reducemore supply on the low type sources and charges
at higher price from the higher type sources, and the
source gets a much higher data rate as shown in Figure 5.
For the optimal contract under complete information, the
average data rate is monotonically increasing with respect
to θ . However, for an optimal contract under incomplete


























Incomplete info., Case A
Incomplete info., Case B
Figure 4 The price assignments in the optimal contracts.
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Incomplete info., Case A
Incomplete info., Case B
Figure 5 The average rate of source in the optimal contracts.
information in both cases A and B, the average data
rate is zero when instant transmission rate θ is small,
while when instant transmission rate θ is big, it is bigger
than that of optimal contract under complete information
result from the changing of the transmission time ratio
assignments.
Figure 6 shows the social surplus and the revenues of
the relay in the optimal contracts. In this histogram, the
1st and 2nd bar denote the social optimal surplus and
the revenue of the relay in the social optimal contract
under complete information, respectively, while the 3rd
and 4th bar denote the social surplus and the revenue
of the relay in the optimal contracts under incomplete
information, respectively. Clearly, social surplus under
incomplete information is only slightly smaller than that
under complete information, which reflects the upper
bound of cooperation gain. In Figure 6, we can see that
the relay gains more revenue from the optimal contract
under incomplete information, at the expense of social
surplus decreasing caused by the dropping out of low type
sources. i.e., a region of qsb = 0. The selfish behavior of the
relay will decrease the social surplus in a short-term, but it
may lead to a higher expected revenue in a long-term. Fur-
thermore, the social surplus in case B is more than that in
case A result from the probability of higher type sources
becomes larger in case B, which reflects that the more
gain of cooperation comes from the more higher type
sources.



























Social surplus, Complete info.
Revenue, Complete info.
Social surplus, Incomplete info.
Revenue, Incomplete info.
Figure 6 The social surplus and the revenues of the relay in the optimal contracts.
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Figure 7 Expected social surplus in the optimal contracts under complete information and incomplete information.
5.2 The Rayleigh fading channel environment
In the Rayleigh fading channel environment, the simu-
lation parameters are set as follows: the channel gain
parameters are λSiP = 1 and λSiR = 1; the noise variance
is σ 2 = 0 dBm. The predetermined threshold Ith varies
from 0∼20 dBm.
Figure 7 displays the social surplus in the optimal con-
tracts under complete information and incomplete infor-
mation with respect to the predetermined threshold Ith
for different number of sources N. It can be seen that
the simulated social surplus curves are in agreement
with derived analytical results. And the cooperative gain
improves with increasing of the interference temperature
of a primary receiver Ith. This is mainly due to when Ith
becomes larger, allowing very high transmit power lev-
els, i.e., sources own very high type. Additionally, the
cooperative gain under incomplete information is only
slightly smaller than that under complete information for
1, 2, and 4 sources, respectively.Moreover, the cooperative
relaying system gets higher diversity gain with a greater
number of sources, when the Ith is low.
Figure 8 displays the seller revenue accrued by the relay.
It can be seen that the simulated revenue curves are in
agreement with derived analytical results under complete
information and incomplete information for 1, 2, and 4
sources, respectively. Furthermore, we can see that the
relay gains more revenue from the optimal contract under
incomplete information. More specifically, the revenue


























Figure 8 Expected relay’s revenue in the optimal contracts under complete information and incomplete information.
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Figure 9 Expected average rate in the optimal contracts under complete information and incomplete information.
obtained by the relay is at least 77% in social surplus under
incomplete information, while it is no more than 15% in
social surplus under complete information.
Figure 9 shows expected average rate of all sources,
It can be seen that the simulated average-rate curves
are in agreement with derived analytical results under
complete information and incomplete information for 1,
2, and 4 sources, respectively. Furthermore, we can see
that the expected average rate under incomplete infor-
mation outperforms that under complete information,
since the higher type source gains more transmission
time ratio assignments and spends with a much higher
price.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a pricing mechanism
for multiuser cooperative communication in a cognitive-
radio-based wireless network using a simple principal-
agent framework, in which the relay acts as a princi-
pal who designs contract items and sources act as the
agent who purchases the relaying service of sources. In
this model, the contract items designed by the princi-
pal consist of a set of rate-price pairs. We have studied
the optimal contract design under complete information
and incomplete information. We have also analyzed the
feasibility and optimality of the feasible contract under
incomplete information and we have derived the best vari-
able assignment and the best price assignment. Further,
we have characterize cooperative gain, relay’s revenue,
and expected data rate in the optimal contract under
complete information and incomplete information. The
proposed mechanism is simple and requires limited inter-
action between source and relay. Numerical simulation
results have shown that this pricing mechanism can lead
to a win-win situation, where the source nodes get good
communication service and the relay nodes maximize
their own profit. From a social surplus perspective, our
results have shown that the social surplus under incom-
plete information is close to the maximum social surplus
under complete information.
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